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ABSTRACT: This paper aims to show that Selim Berker’s widely discussed prime 
number case is merely an instance of the well-known generality problem for 
process reliabilism and thus arguably not as interesting a case as one might have 
thought. Initially, Berker’s case is introduced and interpreted. Then the most 
recent response to the case from the literature is presented. Eventually, it is 
argued that Berker’s case is nothing but a straightforward consequence of the 
generality problem, i.e., the problematic aspect of the case for process reliabilism 
(if any) is already captured by the generality problem. 
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1. Introduction  
In recent debate on process reliabilism1 a specific case crafted by Selim Berker has 
gained attention.2 The case, which concerns cognitive processes and prime 
numbers, is meant as a challenge leveled against reliabilism:3 
                                                        
1 In rough outline process reliabilism as proposed by Alvin Goldman is the following view: A 
belief-token b is epistemically justified if and only if b is caused/sustained by a reliable process. 
Here, a reliable process is a process of belief formation that (would) produce(s) a sufficiently high 
ratio of true to false beliefs, given a specified set of circumstances and a domain of application. 
Process reliabilism was first proposed and defended by Alvin Goldman. See for example Alvin 
Goldman, “What Is Justified Belief?,” in Justification and knowledge, ed. G. Pappas (Springer, 
1979), 1-23; Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Harvard University Press, 1986). 
2 The case was originally stated in Selim Berker, “The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism,” 
Philosophical Issues 23 (2013): 363-387. It was then criticized in Alvin Goldman, “Reliabilism, 
Veritism, and Epistemic Consequentialism,” Episteme 12, 2 (2015): 131-143. Berker responded in 
Selim Berker, “Reply to Goldman: Cutting Up the One to Save the Five in Epistemology,” 
Episteme 12 (2015): 145-153. Recently, Berker’s case was further criticized in Jeffrey Dunn and 
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, “Is Reliabilism a Form of Consequentialism?” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 54 (2) (2017): 183-194.  
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Prime numbers. Suppose the following is true of me: whenever I contemplate 
whether a given natural number is prime, I form a belief that it is not. ‘Is 25 
prime? No, it is not.’ ‘Is 604 prime? No, it is not.’ ‘Is 7 prime? No, it is not.’ Let us 
also stipulate that this is the only cognitive process by which I form beliefs about 
the primeness of natural numbers [...]. Since the ratio of prime to composite 
numbers less than n approaches 0 as n approaches infinity, my belief-forming 
process tends to yield a ratio of true to false beliefs that approaches 1. Therefore 
process reliabilists are forced to say that, because my belief-forming process is 
almost perfectly reliable, any belief formed on its basis is justified. But that’s 
crazy! When I form a belief that 7 is not prime, it is simply not correct to say that, 
although that belief is false, it is epistemically redeemed by the truth of the other 
beliefs which would be formed via the process that led to it.4 
Berker claims that a cognitive process like whenever I contemplate whether a 
given natural number is prime, I form a belief that it is not must be deemed 
reliable by the process reliabilist and that this is absurd. Berker is basing his claim 
on the observation that “Since the ratio of prime to composite numbers less than n 
approaches 0 as n approaches infinity, my belief-forming process tends to yield a 
ratio of true to false beliefs that approaches 1.”5 This will allegedly have the 
consequence that whenever an agent considers whether a given natural number n 
is prime or not, the agent will be epistemically justified in believing that it is not, 
even in cases where this is obviously false (e.g., in the case of 7).  According to 
Berker this leads to a specific type of problematic trade-off between propositions 
for the reliabilist. Since the epistemic status of a concrete belief-token under 
evaluation, say the belief that 7 is not prime, will be determined by the ratio of 
true to false beliefs – some of which will have different propositional content from 
the belief under evaluation – which the prime number-process outputs, it is 
claimed that in such cases process reliabilism sacrifices one proposition for other 
propositions, or that one instance of epistemic wrongdoing is perpetrated for the 
sake of a greater epistemic good, or, echoing Rawls, that the “separateness of 
propositions” is not respected.6 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
3 Note that we use the terms ‘process reliabilism’ and simply ‘reliabilism’ interchangeably 
throughout the paper.  
4 Berker, “The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism,” 374-375.  
5 Berker, “The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism,” 374-375.  
6 Berker, “Reply to Goldman,” 145-153. 
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2. Recent Response by Dunn and Ahlstrom-Vij 
Let us now consider the most recent response7 to Prime Numbers by Jeffery Dunn 
and Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (henceforth ‘D & A’).8 D & A defend process 
reliabilism by observing that Berker helps himself to certain crucial implicit 
assumptions to make his case work, i.e., to make the prime number-process seem 
plausible and reliable:  
[...] Berker wants us to assume that (a) there are processes dedicated to generating 
beliefs about primehood, (b) he is relying on such a dedicated process – let us 
refer to it as P – in the scenario imagined, (c) for any number queried, P generates 
the output that it is not prime, and (d) numbers are queried in some quasi-random 
way among the natural numbers. Under those assumptions, P is reliable. And if 
so, reliabilism should say that the belief that 7 is not prime, generated by way of 
P, is justified. That, we claim, is the correct verdict. Any feeling that this is a 
counter-intuitive verdict should be traced, not to reliabilism, but to the 
psychological implausibility of (a), especially when paired with (d). For note that 
it is implausible indeed that some agent is as likely to contemplate whether 
73,046,482,192,753 is prime as whether 53 is prime.9 
Thus, D & A admit that given assumptions (a)-(d) stated above, the prime number-
process will turn out to be reliable from the perspective of the reliabilist. However, 
they also point to an explanation of the counter-intuitiveness in Prime Numbers. 
They submit that the counter-intuitiveness is not due to process reliabilism per se, 
but to the psychological implausibility of assumption (a), and especially in 
conjunction with (d). It just seems implausible for there to be a human cognitive 
process dedicated to contemplating whether (more or less) random natural 
numbers are prime. Hence, D & A do appear to have an appealing defence of 
process reliabilism against Berker’s case.  
3. The Generality Problem  
Even though we side with D & A with respect to Prime Numbers, we want to add 
some important qualifications in this section. In fact, we believe that D & A give 
Berker too much credit in their response. For it is clear, with or without 
assumptions (a)-(d) explicated, that Berker’s proposed prime number-process has 
                                                        
7 Due to the limitations of space we have decided solely to present the newest response to 
Berker’s case. Goldman gives three objections to the case in Goldman, “Reliabilism, Veritism, and 
Epistemic Consequentialism,” 131-143. Note that none of Goldman’s responses foresees our point 
about the generality problem below (cf. section 3).  
8 Dunn and Ahlstrom-Vij, “Is Reliabilism a Form of Consequentialism,” 183-194. 
9 Dunn and Ahlstrom-Vij, “Is Reliabilism a Form of Consequentialism,” 187. 
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nothing to do with the standard cognitive human processes that are of interest to 
process reliabilists.10 Cardinal examples of such processes are visual perception, 
(long-term) memory, competent deduction etc. Thus, we find it unnecessary for D 
& A to admit that the prime number-process will be deemed reliable by the process 
reliabilist under any circumstances. Berker simply misconstrues the reliabilist.  
To give an extreme example illustrating why one should not give Berker any 
wriggle room in making a strawman out of reliabilism, consider the following 
cognitive process: Every time I see a living individual on the streets of London, I 
will form the belief that this individual is not a crocodile. Given various 
assumptions, e.g., a restriction to normal worlds, we could make this process look 
extremely reliable because only very rarely (if ever) crocodiles are seen on the 
streets of London, but this is still no reason for the process reliabilist to admit that 
this is a reliable cognitive process. An argument for this is straightforward. If one 
were to use the crocodile-process on a sample with 50% humans and 50% 
crocodiles, then the process would only result in true beliefs half of the time. 
Likewise, if we were to use the process on a sample with only 10% humans and 
90% crocodiles, the process would be unreliable. As the crocodile-process has 
exactly the same structure as the prime number-process, we can conclude that the 
reliability of such processes is determined by the specific sample it processes. If 
Prime Numbers had been concerned with a sample of the natural numbers with 
50% primes and 50% composite numbers, then the reliability of the prime 
number-process would have been fifty-fifty. Of course, this is not the kind of 
processes that the reliabilist accepts. That would indeed be absurd! In contrast, 
processes such as competent deduction do produce reliable results across various 
samples (in normal worlds), e.g., it does not matter whether a subject assesses a 
sample of 90% valid arguments and 10% invalid ones or vice versa; competent 
deduction would yield a reliable output of belief-tokes concerning the validity of 
the arguments in any case.  
Now, let us make the following crucial observation. In so far as Berker’s case 
is a problem for reliabilism at all, this is merely because of what follows from the 
generality problem,11 which is already widely accepted as a genuine problem for 
                                                        
10 This point is also underscored by Goldman in his response to Berker: “No process should be 
confined to a single, specific subject-matter. Thus, what Berker calls a ‘process’ in his prime 
number example cannot really be accepted by process reliabilism. Agent S may be said to use a 
certain rule for deciding whether a particular natural number is prime (always saying ’no’ for 
every natural number specified). But this rule should not be equated with a process.” Goldman, 
“Reliabilism, Veritism, and Epistemic Consequentialism,” 141-142. 
11 The generality problem was originally formulated by Goldman in “What Is Justified Belief?” 1-
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process reliabilists. The generality problem points out the difficulties of 
individuating the relevant process in play in a given case. Suppose that you are 
glancing out of your bedroom window, forming the belief that it is raining. 
Presumably, you formed your belief via a reliable process – the question is what 
process exactly? Are you using visual perception, or glancing, or glancing through 
a bedroom window, or perhaps some fourth and somewhat different process? 
Goldman and Beddor describe the problem more generally as follows: 
Any particular belief is the product of a token causal process in the subject’s 
mind/ brain, which occurs at a particular time and place. Such a process token can 
be ‘typed,’ however, in many broader or narrower ways. Each type will have its 
own associated level of reliability, commonly distinct from the levels of reliability 
of other types it instantiates. Which repeatable type should be selected for 
purposes of assigning a reliability number to the process token? If no (unique) 
type can be selected, what establishes the justificational status of the resulting 
belief?12 
Berker’s prime number case is merely an instantiation of this problem. Whenever 
the agent in the case comes across a natural number and wonders whether it is 
prime, she forms a particular negative belief-token, e.g., 7 is not prime. If this can 
be counted as an acceptable cognitive process at all, it can plausibly be “typed” in 
different more or less broad ways. For example, the prime number-process might 
(less artificially) be seen as a narrow kind of heuristic, which is merely applied 
when one considers small natural numbers (say the numbers from 1 to 50). This 
narrowness would indeed impact the reliability associated with the process.13 
Hence, all Berker has shown with Prime Numbers is that it is possible to cook up a 
case individuating a very artificial cognitive process that yields a problem for the 
process reliabilist in terms of the process’s associated level of reliability, but this is 
old news in epistemology as it is merely a consequence of the generality problem. 
Finally, a quick remark on the kind of problematic, epistemic trade-offs 
Berker takes the reliabilist to face, violating the “separateness of propositions” (cf. 
section 1). Setting aside the difficulties of the generality problem and whether 
                                                                                                                      
23, but was later developed in a more systematic way by Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. See, 
for example, Richard Feldman, “Reliability and Justification,” The Monist 68 (1985): 159-174; 
Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism,” Philosophical 
Studies 89 (1998): 1-29. 
12 Alvin Goldman and Bob Beddor, “Reliabilist Epistemology,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy  (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/win2016/entries/reliabilism/>. 
13 Something similar is suggested by Goldman in “Reliabilism, Veritism, and Epistemic 
Consequentialism,” 141. 
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process reliabilism would ever be committed to various peculiar cognitive 
processes with high reliability, it is no secret that process reliabilism is going to 
allow that processes with a high truth ratio can once in a while produce false but 
justified beliefs. Thus, it should be of no surprise to the reliabilist that she can 
sometimes end up in situations where she holds a belief that is epistemically 
justified even if blatantly false. 
